One thing has not changed: Wilson's very rich and well-organized assembly of recent empirical findings.
His opponents, who favor kin selection over group selection, target his interpretation rather than his facts. Indeed, both sides declare that their models are translatable, that is, they could agree with any set of data the other model agreed with (Dawkins 1982, Wilson and Wilson 2007) . If this disagreement were purely about terminology, one would expect the community to gradually lose interest in it. This has not happened. Another option is that this debate continues because it is semantic in a nontrivial way: that is, the models agree with all the data but differ greatly in their heuristic value. In that case, one would expect many methodological comparisons of model performance-for example, comparisons of models' precision, generality, accuracy, complexity, or elegance-for various species and social phenomena in the lab and in nature. Yet these are not a central part of the debate either. Rather, it seems there is no given phenomenon both sides use; instead, disputants clash on how to define or describe the phenomenon that our models attempt to fit to. In short, they disagree over what it is that we see when some ants walk by.
For Wilson and Wilson (2007) , a group is any aggregation of individuals that is small compared with the total population and consists of individuals interacting in a nonrandom way that affects each other's fitness. This is an extremely abstract understanding of what constitutes a group, one that fits many kinds of cases and is almost completely unconstrained by any particular population structure, dynamic, duration, or size. Nor does it require groups to multiply as anything like cohesive wholes in order to acquire heritable variance in fitness. Such a broad definition of "group" is central for Wilson and Wilson's definition of group selection: "the evolution of traits based on the differential survival and reproduction of groups." Such a group selection model does not differ empirically from the similarly broad definition of kin selection: "selection affected by relatedness among individuals" (Foster at al. 2006 ). Again, no particular population structure constrains the application of this kin selection model. The difference lies in model structure: whereas the group selection model partitions the overall selection in the population into "withingroup selection" and "between-groups selection," alternative models-kin selection, reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, or mutualism-consider such partitioning unnecessary, since they all claim that what enhances group fitness always enhances the inclusive fitness of each member in the group (or rather, what Dawkins "only partly facetiously" describes as "that property of an individual organism which will appear to be maximized when what is really maximized is gene survival" [Dawkins 1982, p. 187] ).
This theoretical difference in model structure does not necessarily emphasize different causal factors, because the contexts that can affect the frequency of altruists-population structure and ecology-can be captured by both models (Foster et al. 2006 , Wilson 2008 But why should biologists care, as they obviously do? If the disagreement were mainly about choosing among interchangeable perspectives for the same phenomenon, a choice based on personal taste, historical uses, or heuristic values of group or kin models, one would expect the debate to gradually dissolve in the first two cases and become pragmatic and methodology based in the third. Since the debate has neither dissolved nor turned pragmatic, and since we assume the debate is a rational one, we suggest the remaining explanation as the best one: Wilson and Dawkins disagree over semantics because both hope for their different concepts and models to refer to different evolutionary processes in the world, with each maintaining that his preferred evolutionary process is the more prevalent. To use Dawkins's terms, even when modestly arguing over the flipping picture we see in a Necker cube, the nonmodest aim remains to decipher the picture we see from an East African mountain: are the small spots below insects or buffalos (Dawkins 1982) ?
When Wilson looks at a social group he sees a unit that is a target of a selection, while Dawkins sees an illusory byproduct of a different selection process acting at a single level of organization: gene selection. They disagree the way they do because they aim to accurately represent empirical facts, but since both sides employ overly broad definitions for group, group selection, and kin selection, it becomes very difficult to identify a specific fact-for example, a particular population dynamic or structure-to distinguish between these models in a particular case. We think this situation is unfortunate. Whether or not certain subpopulations have heritable variance in fitness is an empirical question, whatever you choose to call these entities (Griesemer 2000) . Luckily, an alternative is already present in the literature. Wade (1978 Wade ( , 1985 defined group selection and kin selection in accord with different population structures, so his constrained models could clearly refer to distinct selection processes that he and his colleagues then compared in the lab or in the field. Dawkins and Wilson may object that Wade's definitions are too narrow. They would be right in the sense that his definitions do not cover many kinds of cases, yet that does not imply that his definitions do not cover many cases. They do. Indeed, narrow definitionsthose that restrict the kinds of cases-give us tools to determine what is and what is not happening in a given population, whereas the broad definitions used by Dawkins and Wilson will forever talk past each other without resolution.
